sentencings, by judges alone, were subsequently carried out as the living and breathing Framers watched. Silence can sometimes speak volumes. See Pet. at 6 & n.8 .
Thus constitutional interpretation is required to determine whether, and when, the Constitution requires jury involvement in punishment determination. And of course, for at least the past quarter-century, the "intent of the Framers" has been thought to be the primary inquiry in constitutional interpretation! The principal focus of the Blakely Petition for Rehearing was simply to point out that significant evidence of the Framers' own sentencing statutes has, so far, been overlooked. Rather than look to English courts or common law, as the Court did at length in Apprendi (530 U.S. at 478-483), the constitutional focus must be on what the Sixth Amendment's authors thought about sentencing. Our Petition presented undisputable evidence that what they thought is that indeterminate sentencing, without jury involvement, was fine. When this is known (rather than assuming that they were unfamiliar with it, as was repeatedly suggested in Apprendi), the constitutional "leap" needed to say that the Framers nevertheless would have condemned as unconstitutional more precise legislative direction about how to sentence within their ranges, becomes larger than recognized in Blakely. Who knows, had this understanding of the Framers been considered initially, it might even have changed a vote.
A surprising, and significant, point about Blakely, however, is that none of the parties or amici argued to the Court about contemporaneous constitutional history. The briefs are devoid of any historical presentation, even though the question presented in Blakely-within-range sentencing -had been expressly reserved by the Apprendi Court immediately after it presented its historical analysis (erroneously claiming that indeterminate sentencing had been largely unknown to the Framers). Whatever the explanation for this briefing lacuna, it perhaps makes it less surprising that the Blakely Court likewise did not discuss historical sentencing evidence specific to the Framers. Rather, the majority merely said that "we compiled the relevant authorities in Apprendi and need not repeat them here" (124 S.Ct. at 2536-37) .
This was an odd dodge, however, because the issue of legislative sentencing directions given to judges, for sentencing within statutory ranges, was (as the Apprendi Court repeatedly stressed, see 530 U.S. at 481-483), a significantly different one from increasing a statutory maximum range. Indeed, every federal Court ofAppeals to consider the within-range question after Apprendidecided that the distinction made a constitutional difference, and upheld the federal Guidelines. To omit relevant Framer-written history that bears directly on sentencing within ranges thus seems like an interpretive error, one that made asking for rehearing seem more than an idle request.
Readers and scholars will have to draw their own conclusion about whether the Framers' endorsement of indeterminate sentencing ranges, without ever mentioning any conception of jury involvement although they were composing the Sixth Amendment at the very same time, has constitutional import. We do not contend that this history settles the issue, only that it is too important to ignore. Sadly, it is likely to be discounted at this late date -we seem to be too far down the Blakely road, though it has been only a few months, to re-consider the constitutional issue afresh.
3 At the very least, however, this unconsidered evidence shows that the Framers were fully aware that judicial fact-finding would be necessary to set precise sentences for the federal crimes they were defining. Yet they never connected their within-range sentencing regime to any aspect of their Constitutional jury guarantees. Further responses to some of Justice Scalia's criticisms of the dissenters' constitutional views can be found in the Petition at pages 6-7 & n. 9.
On the Cutting Room Floor
The Supreme Court's rules provide that a Petition for Rehearing can be only io pages long, and that no supportive amicus briefs are permitted. Washington State was thus somewhat constrained in how much it could offer in its Petition. Moreover, we were rushing to file the Petition so that it could be considered at the same time as the Solicitor General's expedited certiorari petitions in Booker and Fanfan. 4 (In fact our Petition was listed for the same Court conference as Booker and Fanfan; we do not know if it was actively considered at that time. It was not denied until three weeks later.) Consequently, we were compelled to cut three pages (close to 25%) of our draft on the morning of its printing. Two of the arguments we eliminated may be of interest.
The first "cut" argument noted the possible irony that a guidelines system enacted directly by a legislature (Washington's) might be struck down, while a "sentencing commission's" administrative construct might yet be upheld:
"Washington State is committed to its guideline system, developed after many years of study and well before the federal system. Washington's system represents a democratic legislative choice, rather than the views of an administrative commission. Indeed, Washington's system is more discretionary than, and free of criticisms leveled against, the federal system. Washington's structure does not mandate any upward adjustment, no matter what the facts; has few and reasonable mandatory minimums; and prohibits aggravated sentences based on facts that would establish any additional or more serious crime."
Our second "cut" argument addressed the specific facts of Mr. Blakely's case, and the "harmlessness" of any non-jury sentencing determination, a la United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). The aggravating factor in Mr. Blakely's case was "deliberate cruelty." But Blakely never contested his actions: he kidnapped his estranged wife at gunpoint, and as he compelled his terrified 13 year-old son to watch, Blakely put his wife (the boy's mother with whom he lived) in a coffin-sized box in the back of his pickup. Blakely then ordered the boy to drive a following car, alone, for many miles or he would kill the boy's mother. (Indeed, Mr. Blakely is currently back in custody on charges that he subsequently hired a killer to murder his wife and daughter.) Blakely's only argument at sentencing was that his cruelty was not "deliberate," but the sentencing judge found that that particular argument had been waived. With the basic facts conceded, the only remaining issue to be decided under the Washington statute was whether the facts amounted to cruelty "substantial and compelling" enough to warrant an aggravated sentence. This seems plainly to be an issue of judgment, not fact, of the sort traditionally reserved for judicial determination. Moreover, wasn't the evidence on this factor "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted," which Cotton says is the standard for harmless Apprendi error?
Ah, well, such are the choices any appellate briefwriter makes. And it didn't seem to matter -the Court continued its unbroken 4o-year history of denying Petitions for Rehearing. But whether or not a formal rehearing petition was granted, there is no doubt that this Fall's cases will require the Justices to reconsider the constitutional theory of Blakely. As Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent (counselling "further argument"), it would have been fairer to allow Washington State to participate in that reconsideration, rather than be the sole jurisdiction, at this moment, whose sentencing system has been declared unconstitutional (although experts believe that over 20 other States may be affected).
One further thought. Supreme Court rule 44.1 suggests that Blakely's dissenting Justices could not take part in any rehearing evaluation. The same will not be true this Fall in Booker and Fanfan. Perhaps the "lost" history of Apprendi will be considered there. (2002)). Even Justice Stevens' dissenting views regarding constitutionally-required jury sentencing have been limited to the capital context, in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 476, 482 (1984) . Justice Stevens' early-stated views in Spaziano also go far to explain his steady, if unusual, alliance with Justice Scalia over a decade later in the Apprendi doctrinal line. On this point, one of the many ironies of Blakely is that its newly discovered constitutional limit on legislatively-directed sentencing schemes comes principally from Justice Scalia, who of course has been the Court's leading proponent of constitutional originalism and "plain language" limitation. Compare, for example, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) , issued the same day as Apprendi: "The proposition that the Supreme Court has power to impose extra-constitutional constraints upon the States" is "not the system that was established by the Framers." We think it is clear that this history can influence the Blakely issue without requiring overruling Apprendi. Indeed, a constitutional distinction between facts that simply direct discretion within a clear and reasonable statutory range, versus facts that can increase the range, seems unremarkable. It is quite simply the basic distinction between separate offenses and a single offense that provides for individualized distinctions within an indeterminate sentencing range. A separate "Motion for Expedited Consideration and Argument in Tendem with the Federal Cases" was filed concurrently with our Petition (and was likewise denied on August 23).
Petition for Rehearing on Behalf of
The State of Washington 2004 ). It seems dear that this Court will very soon be readdressing the constitutional underpinnings of its June 24 decision. Rather than being narrowly limited to the federal regime, the upcoming arguments will surely have to address the "deep structure" of Blakely and Apprendi, and will directly impact the interests of dozens of States.
For all these reasons, Washington hereby respectfully requests that rehearing be granted in its case and (by an accompanying Motion) that reargument be scheduled in tandem with the upcoming federal cases. [Page 4] Similar indeterminate sentencing ranges were enacted for an additional 13 federal crimes. 4 Rather than being "foreign" to the Framers, it was the consistent pattern of their legislation. The erroneous notion that precise criminal sentences were "invariabl[y] link [ed] " with the statutory definition of the crime "during the years surrounding our Nation's founding" (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478), was not expressed merely in passing. Rather, it was repeated over and over in the Court's six-page historical discussion. 5 This historical error takes on great significance, when one compares the questions presented in Apprendi and [Page 5] Blakely. In Apprendi, the erroneous historical assumption may have gone unexplored because it could be viewed as inconsequential to the question of facts directed by a legislature to increase the statutory range tied to a crime. Indeed, the Apprendi Court stressed this distinction immediately after canvassing common law -not federal -history. See 530 U.S. at 481 (stressing that Apprendi did not involve "imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute") (emphasis in original). 6 However, when relying on a practice of "fixed-term sentences" when they enshrined the constitutional right to jury trial. Rather, the Bill of Rights' authors wrote indeterminate criminal sentencing provisions. Yet they said nothing to suggest that the jury trial right they were simultaneously advocating would apply to facts relevant to such sentences.
I. The Historical Evidence the Court Has Relied
It cannot be ignored that the Framers were Legislators as well as Constitution-writers. While venerating the right to trial by jury, they also strongly believed in the authority of legislation. It is difficult to imagine that the same legislators who wrote the Sixth Amendment as well as many indeterminate criminal sentencing statutes would have, at the same time, thought unconstitutional legislative directions given to judges as to how to sentence within the ranges they wrote. Rather, it seems likely that the Framers would have approved of giving legislative direction to sentencing judges, had they seen any need for it.
The Court's June 24 opinion took Justice O'Connor to task for an absence of "any [historical] evidence." Slip Op. at 6 n.6 (emphasis in original). But it now appears that, in fact, the Court's own historical account was incomplete and erroneous. Moreover, silence can sometimes "speak volumes:" it can be powerful evidence of the absence of definitive constitutional or legislative intent.
8 Had the Framers believed that aggravating facts relevant to sentencing within the ranges they wrote would be required, under any scenario, to be the special province of [Page 7] the jury, one imagines that they might have said something about it.
9
It must be emphasized, however, that the Court need not decide now what bearing its historical misunderstanding in Apprendi has on the ultimate issues presented here.
Rather, this new historical evidence is sufficient to counsel rehearing. Reid v. Covert, supra. The appropriate occasion for full investigation and evaluation should be a rehearing, not merely the glimpse this Petition provides. The issues are too weighty, and the impact on the States too disruptive, not to merit the fullest and fairest hearing opportunity.
II. Because this Court Will Soon Again Hear Arguments
About Apprendi, Fairness to the State of Washington Supports Reargument in this Case Since Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250-26o (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) , the law of criminal sentencing in the United States has been in turmoil. Six years later -and four weeks after this court's June 24 opinion -the situation is no better. Unprecedented [Page 8] turmoil and uncertainty in theory and in practice reign. It is inevitable that this Court will soon have to confront again the underlying constitutional theory of the Apprendi line of cases. See Booker and Fanfan Petitions, supra.
The Fall arguments this Court is likely to allow cannot, however, realistically be restricted to the narrow question of "does Blakely invalidate the federal guidelines?" Instead, the Court will be compelled to analyze the roots of Apprendi, to address the question whether various distinctions presented by the United States make any constitutional difference.
Accordingly, not just the federal sentencing guidelines, but also the guideline systems in at least 19 states (see n.i, supra), will be at issue in this Court's Fall arguments. Many unanswered questions -including severability of guidelines, facts that initially establish sentencing guideline ranges, prior convictions, consecutive sentences, mandatory minimums, retroactivity, and harmless error doctrines -will be pressed upon the Court. These issues are vital to the 19 affected States and are present in Washington State's case. If the Court does not revise its initial ruling in this case -although the new historical evidence presented above provides ample occasion to do so -reargument would present a full and fair opportunity to address these issues as they affect the States.
Washington is a sovereign jurisdiction no less than the federal government. So too are the 18 other States whose chosen sentencing systems are now affected. "Fair federalism" should not countenance Washington's system being condemned, in a decision that changed common understanding of the law in a way surprising even to seasoned observers, while all other systems are still being considered and the constitutional theory is being reexamined.
If, as seems certain, the Court is going to reconsider the theoretical underpinnings of Apprendi as applied to legislatively-directed sentencing within indeterminate ranges, then Washington should be allowed to reargue this [Page 9] case as part of that enterprise. If any change in analysis is accepted by even one Justice in the majority, the effect could be a significantly different ruling for Washington's statutes. Washington's system should be kept alive rather than condemned before all others. Finally, although this Court earlier stated that its decisions in this area "would in no way hinder the States (or the National Government) from choosing to pursue policies aimed at rationalizing sentencing practices." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 n.ii (i999), it is now apparent that the practical difficulties in complying with the Court's June 24 decision will, in fact, prevent many States from pursuing the sentencing regimes their legislatures prefer. Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Legislatures will adopt statutory responses that are less favorable to the overall interests of criminal defendants. Thus some Members of Congress responded immediately to Blakely by advocating more "mandatory minimum" imprisonment statutes. Brent Kendall, "Bill Adds, Increases Mandatory Minimums," The Daily Journal, at 3 (July 6, 2004) (Rep. Coble: "mandatory minimums may well take on added importance.., as a result of the Supreme Court's action"). While Blakely will produce short-term windfall benefits to some criminal defendants, many experts are coming to agreement that its long-term will include many adverse consequences for that group, including increasing sentencing ranges to the statutory maxima, rolling back sentencing "transparency" and effective appellate review, increasing prosecutorial power, and placing prejudicial facts before juries deciding [Page io] guilt or innocence." If members of the June 24 majority harbored the view that their ruling would lead to more fairness or other benefits for criminal defendants, they ought to vote for rehearing now.
Conclusion
This Court now knows two things it did not know on June 24, 2004: (I) it has proceeded in this area based on a significant historical misunderstanding about the Framers; and (2) its June 24 decision has produced greater disruption, and more adverse consequences for defendants, than the majority had anticipated. The issues are too important to over a third of the States not to permit full consideration of the accurate historical record, and to permit a well-represented State to participate in the expedited consideration that is forthcoming.
Thus the State of Washington respectfully requests this Court to grant it rehearing and expedited scheduling of argument in tandem with the federal cases (or, in the alternative, "hold" this Petition, see n.io supra). 9 As for providing a "coherent alternative meaning for the jury-trial guarantee," Slip Op. at 6 n.6, it would be merely the simple one with which the Framers were familiar: the Legislature defines the crime, and the defendant has the right to ask a jury whether the facts prove him or her guilty. Thus here, Blakely was charged with kidnaping, a simple common-law crime, and he pled guilty, thereby authorizing a sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment. All the facts "essential" to a punishment up to 10 years were encompassed by his plea: Washington's legislature has declared that only the elements of kidnaping simpliciter are "essential" to authorize that full punishment. Cf. Slip Op. at 5, 7 (facts "essential to the punishment" must be found by the jury). The rest is merely legislative direction about the details of within-range sentencing, transmitted directly to sentencing judges. As this Court recognized in Apprendi, the Framers designed "structural democratic constraints" that would block extreme abuses of these principles. 530 U.S. at 490 n.16. Given the relatively small number of crimes extant in 1790 and the clarity and simplicity of their elements, the Framers had no need to consider, or intend, more meaning than this. Their simple understanding ought to control interpretation of the Sixth Amendment here. 
Notes to Petition for Rehearing

